Introduction
The Supreme Court may well conclude in Fraser 1 that the Charter confers upon agricultural workers the full panoply of bargaining rights provided under contemporary Canadian collective bargaining legislation, from the right be represented exclusively by the bargaining agent chosen by the majority, to the right to engage their employer in good faith negotiations, to the right to strike. If it does so, its decision will be greeted with delight by progressive legal scholars, proponents of countervailing power as a strategy of labour market regulation and true believers in the potential of constitutional and/or international rights discourse to transform political economy and social relations. There will be congratulations all 'round: to the skilled advocates who will have achieved a famous victory against long odds; to the imaginative academics who will have erected the conceptual scaffolding on which counsel's arguments will have been constructed; and not least, to the judges who will have finally liberated themselves from the tyranny of precedent and sloughed off 200 years of curial antipathy to workers and their interests.
Of course, not everyone will be delighted. Dour devotees of legal logic and historical accuracy are likely to grimace and roll their eyes; 2 neo-liberals who favour unregulated labour markets and managerial unilateralism will cry havoc;
and sceptics who question the capacity of courts to bring about deep and lasting change, and the wisdom of asking them to do so, will simply shrug. I consider myself to be a progressive scholar who recalls the bygone era of collective bargaining with great fondness; I admire skilled lawyers and freethinking judges and have built the odd conceptual scaffold for both in my time;
and I retain an atavistic attachment to logic and historical accuracy. But most of all, I'm a sceptic. I will shrug.
Of course I will shrug with one shoulder only. I believe that the Agricultural Employees Protection Act 3 was a cynical attempt to perpetuate the unjustified exclusion of agricultural workers from the regime of collective bargaining. And I believe that workers on farms and in food processing plants should have the same rights to organize, bargain and strike as workers in auto plants and banks. So if the Supreme Court reaches the same conclusion, I will smile benignly, and one shoulder will remain firmly in place. But the other will shrug nonetheless.
Let me explain why.
The inefficacy of constitutional litigation
I recently co-authored an article entitled "Does the Charter Matter?" 4 Essentially, the article was an attempt at legal epidemiology. It presents all the social and economic data we could find that might help to determine whether since 1982 Canada had changed in the direction the Charter sought to promote.
Our methodology was far from perfect, as we would be the first to admit; but as no one has so far challenged it or proposed a better one, I stand by our 
The role of constitutionalization in reducing the autonomy and effectiveness of labour law
The historic trajectory of labour law has been in the direction of autonomy and away from the values, doctrines, processes and institutions of the "regular" legal system. This was not just because individual judges were often consciously hostile to the interests of workers. It was because that system was premised on a paradigm of social relations in which workers occupied a The Supreme Court's unwillingness to consider workers or poor people as an "analogous" group worthy of Charter protection confirms (as does everyday observation) that the real constitution trumps the Charter. See e.g. Health Services supra note 7 at para 166; Dunmore supra note 6; Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General) [2002] The margin of deference accorded arbitral and labour board decisions by reviewing courts has fluctuated considerably over the past half century. Is it possible that successive restatements of that margin of deference is affected by the reviewing court's wishes to sustain or overturn the tribunal's decision? Surely not. For the most recent iteration of the deference debate see New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir 2008 SCC 9. 16 For an early and persuasive statement of the case for displacing common law doctrine and remedies relating to industrial conflict with statutory norms rules remedies, • The Court might decide that agricultural workers must be treated in precisely the same way as all other "employees". That is to say, they should have the right to strike after selecting a bargaining agent, securing certification, engaging in good faith negotiations, and exhausting the conciliation procedures laid down in the Labour Relations Act . However, such rights might avail them naught: each stage of the statutory procedures is so lengthy that agricultural workers (at least those employed in seasonal work) might be unable to exercise them.
• Or the Court might permit legislatures to establish a separate but equal collective bargaining regime for agricultural workers, as presently exists for civil servants, 18 to Z are available on request.
• Or the Court might be less prescriptive. It might say, as it did in Pepsi Cola with regard to picketing, 26 that agricultural workers are free to strike at any time so long as they do not commit a crime or tort (or, for that matter, a breach of statute or contract). Anyone familiar with the common law or criminal law of picketing will recognize how drastic a restriction lies concealed within this apparently modest caveat.
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Postmodernism has been described as "private jokes in public places".
The same might be said of the Pepsi Cola decision, and indeed of many
Charter decisions, once their post-history unfolds.
To constitutionalize the right of workers to participate in a particular system of collective bargaining, then, is to initiate a process of institutional design, and Of course I accept that legislators -also known as politicians -may act in ways that conform to neither expert advice nor judicial ideals. And of course, I
accept that the result of legislation may be bad both for democracy and for industrial relations. BC Health Service, Dunmore and now Fraser are cases in point. I do argue, however, that to embed the deep structures of industrial relations in the constitution is to ensure that over the long term, the approach of courts will prevail over that of experts.
Finally, constitutionalizing particular aspects of any social or economic system is likely to ensure its ultimate obsolescence. 30 Will we, for example, always conclude that a conflict-based system which entrenches the right to strike is intrinsically fairer or more efficient than a principles-based system in which wages and working conditions are adjudicated? or a system in which important benefits are delivered to workers by the state rather than through collective bargaining? or a power-sharing system based on worker share ownership and union representation on corporate boards of directors? I am not advocating these systems over our present system; but I am arguing that we ought to be as wary of constitutionalizing our present exclusive-representation strike-driven 
What does constitutionalization signify?
What remains, of course, is to clarify what we mean by "constitutionalization".
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Much of the discussion has proceeded on the basis that constitutionalization involves embedding in our basic law a legally enforceable right from which no legislature or court can derogate. Used in this sense, constitutionalization requires that we identify some specific constitutional provision and determine whether an activity, say a strike, is protected or guaranteed by it. Thus, the Court of Appeal in Fraser held that the right to bargain collectively, as understood in our present system, is guaranteed by section 2 of the Charter as the exercise of freedom of association.
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Brian Langille has argued to the contrary, that the right of agricultural workers to be treated like other workers should be guaranteed under section 15 of the Charter as an equality right.
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And conceivably -nothing is beyond conceiving after Chaouli 34 -since collective bargaining, and ultimately strikes, may in given circumstances be the only means by which these workers could defend their "liberty" or the "security of
[their] person", they should be guaranteed under section 7.
I will leave that debate to others. Instead I want to note that an older and different meaning of "constitution" is rooted in British public law and therefore, because of its "constitution similar in principle" preamble, in our Constitution Act as well. In this usage, the word "constitution" is less prescriptive and more descriptive: it identifies, explains and give legitimacy to the way in which things 31 For a taxonomy see Harry Arthurs, "The Constitutionalization of Employment Relations: Pernicious problems, multiple models" (2010) Fraser to the effect that since "labour relations policy in Canada has long recognized" the desirability of our present collective bargaining system, the main features of that system are entitled to "constitutional" protection.dissimilar argument is often made by workers who rely on "custom" or "past practice" to justify their claims and by employers who rely on "management rights" to justify their unilateral control of the workplace or enterprise governance.
Such arguments are not without their difficulties. For example, if the longevity of a system automatically entitles it to constitutional protection, how will they ever be superseded by new ones? Nonetheless, the notion of describing a privileged and presumptively entrenched status quo as "constitutional" does serve a useful purpose. If forces us to look carefully at "how things are constituted", and to scrutinize proposed changes with equal care.
Juridical effects aside, then, the real importance of attributing Charter significance to workers' rights is that we bring them into clearer focus as established elements of our political economy and social order -as conventions of public life, as it were, or the traditional prerogatives of working people. This is an attractive development; but note: it represents a profound reversal of our traditional characterization of workers' rights. Charter standards -the courts seem to be saying -precisely because they implicate issues of self-fulfillment, personal identity and dignity, the well-being of individuals and families, freedom, justice and power.
This shift in the characterization of workers' rights and interests is also manifest in the Court's changing attitude to international labour standards. Such standards were once adjudged so remote from "local" wage bargains struck "in the province" and under its legislative authority that even their ratification by the federal government gave them no legal effect. 38 Now, it appears, they are so fundamental to our jurisprudence that even without federal accession or enactment they pour new meaning into the Charter, delegitimate provincial legislation and re-write provincial common law. This re-conceptualization of labour issues would also allow us to integrate labour market policies with those in adjacent fields. Minimum wage statutes do not merely define the terms of the employment bargain; they help to reduce the incidence and eliminate the effects of poverty. Pension laws do not merely regulate arrangements under which wages can be deferred and tax-sheltered until retirement; they define the life prospects of a rapidly-increasing segment of Canada's population. And collective bargaining legislation does not merely create countervailing power in individual workplaces; it enables large aggregations of workers to influence debates on issues ranging from health care to immigration to foreign policy (which they once did, and may again).
Charter analysis may indeed be self-referential; constitutional litigation may be unavailing. But the implied invitation to reconsider our traditional constitutional characterization of "labour" has its attractions. It may open our eyes to new policy approaches, engage new actors, remind us of normative regimes whose influence we have not previously suspected and, especially, show us new connections amongst ideas and events, interests and institutions. The debates triggered by these revelations may ultimately generate constitutional changes -not changes read into the formal constitution by judges, but changes wrought in the "real constitution" by the contending forces of political economy.
If so, neither shoulder will shrug.
